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OWN YOUR MARK: TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Part I. Introduction
Oprah Winfrey’s couch has had many iconic moments, after all who could forget Tom
Cruise ecstatically jumping up and down declaring his love for Katie Holmes. Unfortunately, for
Oprah, it may be trademark owners turn to jump for joy at her expense thanks to a recent Second
Circuit decision. The Second Circuit expressly disavowed a standard proposed by the Sixth
Circuit, which stated that an alleged infringer must use a trademark as a trademark in order for a
plaintiff to bring an infringement action.1 As a result, the Sixth Circuit broadened a narrow
exception to non-infringing use of a mark that could result in serious injury to trademark owners.
The Second Circuit correctly emphasized likelihood of consumer confusion as the proper test
and not whether the alleged infringer had used the mark as a trademark.2
It is a considerable challenge to claim that Oprah is not a major celebrity and media giant
today. Oprah’s brand, which is her name, is internationally recognizable. Oprah is probably one
of the most recognized and respected celebrities. She has created a media empire around her
name and recently launched her own network. Around this empire, Oprah has established a
family of trademarks and brands. The strength, reputation, and recognition of Oprah’s brands,
though, do not give Oprah carte blanche to promote her brands at the expense of smaller
trademark owners. Recently, Oprah’s company arranged to buy the rights to the trademark of
“OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK” in order to avoid any infringement action with the
1

See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.
2009).
2
See Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d 295.

previous owner of the mark.3 Oprah and her affiliates wanted the mark “OWN” for Oprah’s
emerging cable channel. The only problem is that Oprah’s ensuing use of the “OWN” mark was
eerily similar to one other trademark. Simone Kelly-Brown is a motivational speaker who
cultivated a brand around the mark “Own Your Power.”4 Oprah’s company would have
discovered this information when it was acquiring the rights to OWN ONYX WOMAN
NETWORK.5 Oprah then launched a promotional event in conjunction with her new media
empire by hosting an event around the theme “Own Your Power”.6 The Second Circuit held that
although Oprah and her affiliates may not have used “Own Your Power” as a trademark there
was still a real possibility that consumers were likely to be confused.7 In holding so, the Second
Circuit directly attacked the standard promulgated by the Sixth Circuit that required use as a
trademark as a threshold matter for an infringement action.8
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold to
others and to indicate source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”9 The basic function
of trademarks is to serve as source-identifiers.10 Trademark law attempts to protect both the
consumer and the owner of the mark from unfair competition that results when another
appropriates the mark for his own benefit.11 The danger is that infringing users can free ride on
the owner of the mark’s goodwill and reputation by inducing the consumer to believe that the

3

Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 299–300 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 299.
5
Id. at 299–300.
6
Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 301.
7
Id. at 307.
8
Id. at 305–307.
9
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
10
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 US 159, 163–164 (1995).
11
See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d Cir. 1928).
4

goods originate from the same source.12 In order to bring an infringement action, a plaintiff must
prove he owns the mark; the mark was used in commerce, and use of the mark likely caused
consumer confusion.13 The main claim in an infringement action is likelihood of confusion.
Likelihood of confusion exists when “an appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers are
likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”14
The Sixth Circuit in Hensley advocated that there could never be likelihood of confusion
when trademarks are not used in a trademark way.15 The court based its decision off an earlier
case that held that trademarks in the post-domain path do not signify source and thus the eightfactor likelihood of confusion analysis is not applicable.16 The rationale was that the purpose of
trademarks is to signify source and that using a mark in the post-domain path of a website does
not signify source to the consumer. Since the mark is not being used in such a “trademark way”
the court found that the likelihood of consumer confusion was highly unlikely and declined to
apply the eight-factor test.17 The Sixth Circuit founded this rationale off a case out of the Ninth
Circuit, which propounded the concept of nominative fair use as a non-infringement use.18 The
Second Circuit disagreed with this standard because it presupposes consumer confusion, or lack
thereof, without even addressing the traditional eight-factor, fact intensive inquiry.19 The Second
Circuit observed that the standard proffered by the Sixth Circuit could potentially prevent
legitimate infringement claims from reaching the likelihood of confusion analysis.20 Should the
courts follow the Sixth Circuit and decide, as a threshold matter, whether the alleged

12

Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d Cir. 1928).
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
14
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
15
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2009).
16
Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003).
17
See id.
18
See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub. Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–308 (9th Cir. 1991)
19
See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013).
20
Id.
13

infringement uses the mark in a trademark way or is the Second Circuit correct in disregarding
this requirement as overly restrictive?
This Note will argue that the Second Circuit is correct in dismissing the Sixth Circuit’s
standard. Part II of this Note will outline the applicable background trademark law and policy.
Part III will focus on the cases that led to the Second and Sixth Circuit split. Part IV will discuss
how these cases apply to the relevant trademark law and the possible consequences.
Part II. Background Trademark Law
The History and Basics of Trademark Law
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”21 A service mark
is “a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and
distinguish them from the services of others.”22 Since both are extremely similar, they are often
commonly labeled as trademarks.23 Trademarks serve several functions, including; signifying
source, to signify the same source controls the trademarked goods; to signify a consistent level of
quality with the goods bearing the trademark; and as an advertisement tool.24 Additionally,
trademarks serve as “an objective symbol of the good will the business has built up.25
Trademark law thus strives to strike a balance between protecting the consuming public
from deception and protecting property that a person has put considerable time, effort, and
resources into developing, with encouraging competition.26 The American concept of the free
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15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Id.
23
J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3.1(4th ed. 2013).
24
Id. at § 3.2.
25
Id.
26
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
22

market focuses on the theory that competition, uninhibited, “is both socially and economically
desirable” because it keeps prices down for consumers while still allowing business owners to
turn a profit.27 Within this system, the well-known adage “imitation is the greatest form of
flattery” took shape. Businesses’ strategies, ideas, and other aspects, once placed in the public
domain, become open to imitation.28 Intellectual property, including trademarks, is one of the
specifically identified exceptions to this thought.29
Therefore, on one side is the basic tenet that free competition serves substantial social
and economic interests and should be unfettered. On the other side, trademark law seeks to
protect both the public and trademark owners from conduct that goes beyond imitation and
approaches deception.30 A competitor, who attempts to copy a mark, injures the trademark
owner because he is, in essence, standing in as the owner and is speaking for him without the
owner’s consent.31 It does not matter if there is no economic injury to the trademark owner or
even if the competitor has enhanced the owner’s reputation, the injury occurs immediately when
the competitor appropriates the mark and, by doing so, holds himself out as the owner.32
Additionally, the consuming public is harmed when there are multiple, similar marks. The
consumer’s search costs, the time it takes him to make a decision, will rise as he must spends
time differentiating between the competing marks and deciding which one stands for the quality

27

McCarty on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 1.1.
Id. at § 1.2.
29
Id.
30
“This area of the law is generally referred to as ‘unfair competition’ – unfair because, by using a rival’s mark, the
infringer capitalizes on the investment of time, money and resources of his competitor, unfair also because, by doing
so, he obtains the consumer’s hard-earned dollar through something akin to fraud.” New Kids on the Block v. News
America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992).
31
“If another uses [the trademark], he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own
control . . . for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a
mask.” Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d. Cir. 1928).
32
See id.
28

and product he desires.33 Therefore, trademark laws serve an important function within the free
market society because they prevent consumer confusion as well as allow the owner to control
his products and reputation.34
Use as a Trademark
Use as a trademark can be a tricky question since there are multiple meanings to “use as a
trademark,” for instance, “use in commerce” and “use of a mark” both qualify as “trademark
use.”35 Use in commerce is a requirement for trademark protection. After all, how can
something serve as a source-identifier to the consuming public if there is nothing for the public
to consume?36 “The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in the mark.”37 Trademark plaintiffs do
not need to prove the “use in commerce” requirement; rather, it is fulfilled whenever a mark is
fixed to goods “in any manner.”38 Token use does not count as “use in commerce.”39 Courts
have found use of a trademark on internet search engines to trigger a competitor’s mark or copy
satisfied the “use in commerce” requirement.40 Slogans have presented a particular difficult
problem for courts in determining whether the slogans are trademarks. “Courts have protected
advertising slogans under the theory that companies have devoted a great deal of time and
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See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–164 (1995).
See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d. Cir. 1979).
35
“Defendants conflate two distinct concepts, use of a trademark in commerce and use as a mark, both of which,
confusingly, we describe by the shorthand phrase ‘trademark use.’” Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 305 (2d
Cir. 2013).
36
See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3.3.
37
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
38
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
39
See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding Proctor and
Gamble’s attempts to preserve rights in mark by attaching it to other products and sending out small, scheduled,
shipments was token use); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding Blue Bell did
not meet the “use in commerce” requirement by attaching the new mark to other blue jeans that already bore an
established mark).
40
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125–126 (2d Cir. 2009) .
34

expense into creating an association in the minds of consumers between a slogan and a particular
product.”41 Courts have also determined that slogans did not give rise to trademark protection.42
While “use in commerce” gives rise to trademark protection, trademark owners may still
have recourse if others are using their mark. This “use as mark” is not as clear as the “use in
commerce” requirement. “The critical enquiry in determining whether a designation functions as
a mark is how the designation would be perceived by the relevant public.”43 For the most part,
whether a designation is used as a mark is readily apparent and should not involve focused legal
examination.44 The dispositive question of whether the designation is a mark is whether the user
attempted to draw attention to the designation.45 The Second Circuit has stated that when
determining whether the trademark has been used as a mark, the critical inquiry is how the mark
was used.46
A subset of “use as a mark” that has particularly vexed courts is whether use of a
personal name can give rise to an infringement action.47 In Madrigal, the court held that “when
an individual sells no more than the right to use his name as a trade name or trademark,” he is
not prohibited “from taking advantage of his individual reputation by establishing a company
which competes against the purchaser of the trade name,” or “from advertising, in a not overly
intrusive manner, that he is affiliated with a new company.”48 It follows then, that although a
person establishes a trademark in his own name and is allowed to transfer ownership of that
41

Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 309 (2d Cir. 2013); See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d
1225 (7th Cir. 1993); Cont’l Scale Corp. v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 517 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Chem.
Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
42
See, e.g., In re International Paper Company, 142 U.S.P.Q. 503, 1964 WL 8038 (T.T.A.B. 1964); In re Illinois
Bronze Powder & Paint Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. 459, 1975 WL 20850 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re European-American Bank &
Trust Company, 201 U.S.P.Q. 788, 1979 WL 24821 (T.T.A.B. 1979).
43
In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1229, 2010 WL 3441109 (T.T.AB. 2010).
44
See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3.3.
45
See JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009).
46
“In determining whether a use is made as a mark, however, we make a more detailed determination of the
particular manner in which the mark was used.” Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 306 (internal citations omitted).
47
See Madrigal Audio Laboratories v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1986).
48
Id. at 823.

mark, he is not prevented from capitalizing on his own reputation so long as he comports himself
in the proper way.49
Even if an alleged infringer uses a trademark, the infringer can utilize several defenses.
For instance, an infringer can allege that the use is not likely to cause consumer confusion
because the infringer is using the mark in a non-trademark way and it is not a source-identifier.50
Additionally, if the alleged infringer used the mark in its original descriptive sense then the
infringer could raise a fair use defense.51 This nominative fair use defense applies to cases where
there is no “attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one
product for a different use.”52 This occurs when “the only word reasonably available to describe
a particular thing is pressed into service.”53 The alleged infringer is not attempting to deceive the
public because he is not using the mark to signify his own goods but is, instead, truthfully
describing the original owner’s product.54 The existence of direct competition does not turn
nominative fair use into an infringement action.55 In New Kids on the Block, several news
outlets set up hotlines and charged customers to call and answer poll questions about the music
group.56 The nominative fair use defense requires the alleged infringer to prove three things: (1)
the product is not “readily identifiable without the use of the trademark”; (2) “only so much of
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See Madrigal Audio Laboratories v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 823 (2d Cir. 1986); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc.,
579 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2009).
50
See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the
existence of the trademark in the post-domain path was not a source-identifier and was not likely to cause consumer
confusion).
51
See Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding the Chicago Tribune used the mark
“The Joy of Six” to describe the Chicago Bulls sixth championship and did not infringe); New Kids on the Block v.
News America Pub., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting there was no feasible way to refer to music group other
than as their name)
52
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
53
Id.
54
“When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to
prevent its being used to tell the truth.” Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
55
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309.
56
Id. at 309–310.

the mark . . . may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product”; and (3) the alleged
infringer must do nothing that suggests sponsorship or affiliation by the trademark owner.57
The concept of fair use expanded with the rise in technology. Courts have addressed
when the use of trademarks can rise to the level of infringement with regard to the internet.
Courts have stated “a website’s domain name signifies its source of origin.”58 “Words in domain
names can and do communicate information as to the source or sponsor of a website.”59 But
“when a domain name is used only to indicate an address on the Internet and not to identify the
source of the specific goods and services, the name is not functioning as a trademark.”60
Additionally, the post-domain path does not signify origin but instead, “serves a different
function.”61 The court in Interactive Products noted that consumers looking for a specific
product were not likely to be confused by the existence of the mark in the post-domain path of
defendant’s website because that is not how a prospective purchaser would search for the product
in question.62
Therefore, use as a trademark does not give rise to an infringement action when the
designation is used solely in its descriptive sense,63 there is no other reasonable way to describe
the product or service, the mark is being used to designate plaintiff’s goods or services and not
defendants,64 and the mark is not being used as a source-identifier on the internet.65

57

New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1991).
Patmont Motor Werks v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C96-2703, 1997 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 208877, *4 (N.D. Cal.
Dec.18 1997).
59
PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Tech, 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2003).
60
Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 62 –628 (6th Cir. 1998).
61
Id.
62
See Interactive Prods Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing
consumers were not likely to enter “a2zsolutions.com/desk/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm” instead of
“Laptraveler.com” when searching for plaintiff’s Laptraveler product).
63
See Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001).
64
See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d 302.
65
See Interactive Prods Corp., 326 F.3d 687.
58

The use of a mark in the secondary market also does not rise to the level of
infringement.66 In Champion Spark Plug, the defendant repaired used “CHAMPION” spark
plugs and resold them with each individual plug stamped with the word “reused.”67 The court
noted that despite the restoration, the spark plugs remained the product of the plaintiff.68 The
court likened this situation to the selling of a used car and how it would be tedious to require a
secondary seller to remove the manufacturer’s designation solely because he had repaired some
aspect of the car.69 “Inferiority is immaterial so long as the article is clearly and distinctly sold
as repaired or recondition rather than as new.”70 The court noted “the second-hand dealer gets
some advantage from the trademark . . . that is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is
not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or the
reconditioning by the dealer.”71
Likelihood of Confusion
The likelihood of consumer confusion and not actual consumer confusion is essential in a
trademark infringement action.72 A requirement of actual confusion would frustrate trademark
owners from protecting their marks when an infringing product is new on the market.73 Courts
look to whether there is a likelihood of confusion when examining whether or not there is an
infringing use of a trademark.74 Likelihood of confusion occurs when a significant number of
prudent consumers are likely to be misled or confused “as to the source of the goods in

66

See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
Id. at 126.
68
Id.
69
See id.
70
Id. at 130.
71
Id.
72
Likelihood of confusion results in injunctive relief but if a plaintiff seeks monetary damages then actual confusion
must be proved. See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.12.
73
See id.
74
Id. at § 23.1.
67

question.”75 “The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe
that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.”76 There are eight
factors that courts consider in determining likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the mark;
(2) degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood
the senior user will bridge the gap; (5) actual consumer confusion; (6) the junior user’s intent; (7)
the quality of the junior user’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.77 Nearly every
circuit has this fact-intensive, eight-factor test, widely known as the Polaroid factors.78 None of
the Polaroid factors is expressly dispositive; instead, the analysis looks at the factors in their
totality.79 It should be noted that while no singular factor is dispositive, courts have sometimes
found that intentional copying or bad faith in adopting a mark creates a presumption of actual
confusion.80 There is a circuit split of authority among the circuits as to whether likelihood of
confusion is an issue of law or an issue of fact.81 Most circuits view likelihood of confusion as
an issue of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.82 The Second and Sixth Circuits
take the stance that likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of fact and law; the factual
findings of the eight-factor test are questions of fact while the balancing of those factors is a
question of law.83
There are several types of confusion including initial interest confusion (or pre-sale
confusion), post-sale confusion, confusion as to affiliation, and reverse confusion. Initial interest
75

Light Sources, iNc. v. Cosmedico Light, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 432 (D. Conn. 2005).
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991).
77
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983).
78
See Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
79
Star Indus v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005).
80
“Intentional copying gives rise to a presumption of a likelihood of confusion.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d
950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980).
81
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.67.
82
Id.
83
See Id.
76

confusion occurs when a prospective customer, at first glance, believes there is some connection
between the product and the original mark owner.84 Thus in Steinway & Sons, the court
observed that a customer searching to buy a piano might think of the quality and reputation of a
Steinway piano upon hearing the name “Grotrian-Steinweg” and believe the pianos are somehow
connected.85 The competing marks do not have to look or sound similar as long as the consumer
would initially believe there is some kind of affiliation.86 In Mobil Oil, the defendant company
made wholesale oil deals, mostly by phone. The court found that the defendant could gain
credibility “during the initial phases of a deal” because its use of the name “Pegasus” would call
to mind Mobil’s well-known mark of a flying horse.87 While courts are reluctant to extend such
“call-to-mind” protection, it is appropriate when there is such overriding similarity between so
many of the Polaroid factors.88
Post-sale confusion normally occurs after the point of sale where the buyer is not the one
confused but others may be.89 The danger is that even if the buyer knows the product is a knockoff, others could be confused.90 This could occur if the infringing product is gifted to another or
sold on the secondary market as speaking to the quality of the legitimate product. Therefore,
harm befalls the original trademark owner when inferior goods are traded on his reputation
outside of his control.91 For example, a purchaser of imitation jeans that employ iconic,

84

See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975);
see also Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding nightclub could induce
potential customers to enter by believing the establishment was somehow affiliated with the estate of Elvis Presley,
despite the fact that once inside, the consumer would realize there is no such affiliation).
85
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d at 1342.
86
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d. Cir. 1987).
87
Id.
88
See id.
89
See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Wateches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d
Cir. 1955).
90
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.7.
91
See Rolex Watch, Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986).

protectable, stitching could influence others who believe he has bought the original.92
Additionally, back pocket designs on jeans have also been held likely to confuse in the post-sale
context because of the effect on prospective purchasers “who carry even an imperfect
recollection of Strauss’s mark and who observe Wrangler’s projecting label after the point of
sale.”93 Likelihood of confusion as to source is the more common occurrence but the Lanham
Act expressly accounts for confusion “as to affiliation, connection, or association.”94
“Reverse confusion occurs when the junior user’s advertising and promotion so swamps
the senior user’s reputation in the market that customers are likely to be confused into thinking
that the senior user’s goods are those of the junior user.”95 Prospective consumers may believe
that the senior user is infringing the junior user’s mark and, as a result, the senior user’s
reputation is irreparably harmed.96 “The result is that the senior user loses the value of the
trademark, its product identity, corporate identity, and control over its goodwill and reputation,
and ability to move into new markets.”97 For the most part, cases of reverse confusion occur
when a large company infringes the mark of a small trademark owner.98 The seminal reverse
confusion case originated in the Tenth Circuit.99 In Big O, a small tire retailer in Colorado began
selling its own “BIGFOOT” tires in the spring of 1974.100 That summer, Goodyear set in motion
the decision to sell its own “BIGFOOT” tires and began advertising.101 The court observed it
was perfectly reasonable for prospective consumers to believe that Big O was selling Goodyear’s
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“A consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans with appellee and that association will
influence his buying decisions.” Lois Sportswear, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1986).
93
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980).
94
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
95
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.10.
96
Banff v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1988).
97
Ameritech v. American Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1987).
98
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.10.
99
See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
100
Id. at 1368.
101
Id.

tires.102 Reverse confusion cases are unique in that a plaintiff senior user is more likely to
prevail when its trademark is relatively weak.103 This is because the weaker the senior user’s
mark the more likely the junior user’s appropriation of the mark, in conjunction with the junior
user’s advertising and saturation of the market, will lead consumers to believe the senior user is
an unauthorized infringer.104
The Second Circuit identified two explicit examples of instances when infringement
actions involving non-trademark use that were allowed to proceed under a likelihood of
confusion analysis. One such instance involved whether a slogan playing off a trademarked song
was fair use.105 The court in that case found fair use even though the slogan was not being used
as a mark.106 The owners of the trademark in the well-known song “Sing, Sing, Sing” brought an
infringement action against a manufacturer and seller of golf clubs for using similar stock music
and the phrase “Swing, Swing, Swing” in television advertisements.107 The Second Circuit
emphasized the proper inquiry for trademark infringement is there is a likelihood of confusion
when “consumers believe that the trademark owner sponsors or endorses the use of the
challenged mark.”108 Although the Second Circuit ultimately decided the case was within
copyright law and not within the realm of trademark law, the court clearly stated that likelihood
of consumer confusion was the key analysis and not whether the alleged infringing use was use
of a trademark.109
An in-depth look at the facts and reasoning of the seminal cases is helpful to understand
the various trademark issues.
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Part III: The Circuit Split
The Sixth Circuit and Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc.
Hensley Manufacturing and ProPride are both Michigan corporations that compete
against each other in the trailer-towing industry.110 Hensley Manufacturing bought the business
of Jim Hensley in 1994.111 The company then registered trademarks for the name “Hensley” and
“Hensley Arrow”.112 “Hensley Manufacturing alleges that these trademarks have become widely
known and respected in the marketplace for trailers and recreational vehicles.”113 In 2007,
Hensley Manfucaturing’s sales and marketing director, Sean Woodruff, left the company and
formed ProPride.114 Jim Hensley also left Hensley Manufacturing and licensed his new trailer
hitch design to ProPride.115 ProPride advertised the new trailer hitch as designed by Jim
Hensley.116 ProPride’s advertisements expressly disclaimed Jim Hensley’s affiliation with
Hensley Manufacturing.117 Hensley Manufacturing sued for trademark infringement and
claimed that ProPride’s used its trademark and caused substantial confusion in the market.118
In determining the trademark infringement claim, the Sixth Circuit found the only issue
was whether there was any likelihood of confusion.119 While the court acknowledged that it
would typically apply the eight-factor test in a likelihood of confusion matter, it added an
additional, threshold requirement of “whether the defendants are using the challenged mark in a
way that identifies the source of the goods.”120 The court further held that if the mark is not
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being used as a source-identifier then it is a non-trademark use and “trademark infringement
laws, along with the eight-factor analysis, do not apply.”121
The Sixth Circuit founded its reasoning on a previous case, Interactive Prods. Corp. v.
a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc.122 Interactive Products and a2z both sold portable laptop
stands.123 Problems arose when one of Interactive Products’ partners left and formed his own
company.124 Around the same time, Interactive Products ended its relationship with a2z, with
whom it had previously sold its product.125 Then, a2z sold the portable laptop stand through its
website.126 The departing Interactive Products partner then struck up a business relationship with
a2z to sell his own design of laptop stand.127 The problem was that a2z never changed the
website. This resulted in Interactive Products’ trademark, “LAPTRAVELER”, to appear in the
post-domain path of a2z’s website in conjunction with the sale of a now competing product The
Mobile Desk.128
The court recognized that it would traditionally apply the eight-factor likelihood of
confusion test but only if relevant consumers would believe the products are affiliated.129 The
proper inquiry, for the Sixth Circuit, was “whether defendants are using the challenged mark in a
way that identifies the source of their goods.”130 The court found that if defendants were using
the mark “in a non-trademark way – that is, in a way that does not identify the source of a
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product – then trademark infringement and false designation of origin laws do not apply.”131
Particular to this case, the court found distinctions to domain names and post-domain path
controlling.132 “Words in many domain names can and do communicate source.”133 While this
is readily apparent it is not always the case, “[w]hen a domain name is used only to indicate an
address on the Internet and not to identify the source of specific goods and services, the name is
not functioning as a trademark.”134 “The post-domain path of a URL, however, does not
typically signify source. The post-domain path merely shows how the website’s date is
organized within the host computer’s files.”135 The court concluded that since “there is not any
evidence that the post-domain path of a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page signifies source,
it was unnecessary . . . to examine the eight-factors traditionally used to determine likelihood of
confusion between two source-signifying marks.”136 In summation, the Sixth Circuit expressly
held that there is no likelihood of confusion when a trademark is used in a way that does not
signify source.
The Second Circuit and Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey
Simone “Kelly-Brown owns a motivational services business organization around the
concept ‘Own Your Power.’”137 She “hosts a radio show, holds conferences and retreats, and
writes a blog promoting” this concept.138 She owns a federally registered service mark in “Own
Your Power.”139 As the court properly pointed out, “Oprah almost needs no introduction.”140
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She has been a staple on television and has subsequently built a “vast media empire, which
consists of, inter alia, a magazine, and a website.”141 Contemporaneously to Kelly-Brown
registering her mark, Oprah and her affiliates “arranged for the transfer of a trademark in ‘OWN
ONYX WOMAN NETWORK’ . . . to avoid an infringement action from that mark’s original
owner.”142 The court noted that Oprah “would likely have been aware of Kelly-Brown’s pending
registration . . . since the same search defendants would have run to locate and negotiate the
transfer of the mark in ‘OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK’ would have also revealed KellyBrown’s mark.”143 Kelly-Brown then brought a trademark infringement action against Oprah
and her affiliates originating in September 2010.144
On September 13, 2010 the October issue of Oprah’s magazine, “O”, hit shelves with a
cover that “prominently featured the words ‘Own Your Power.’”145 Three days later, the
magazine held an “Own Your Power” event with other businesses.146 The event featured “a
seminar and workshop offering motivational advice regarding self-awareness, self-realization,
and entrepreneurship, under the aegis of the them ‘Own Your Power.’”147 Several celebrities in
attendance posed for pictures against a backdrop that also prominently featured the phrase “Own
Your Power.148 Oprah’s website uploaded videos of the event on over seventy-five webpages
that featured an “Own Your Power” banner in the header “that resembled the layout of the
October issue of the [m]agazine.”149 Oprah’s magazine’s Facebook page displayed photographs
from the event and Oprah showed the cover of the October issue on her nationally televised

141

Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 299–300.
143
Id. at 300.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 301.
147
Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 302.
148
Id. at 301–302.
149
Id. at 302.
142

show.150 As a result, Kelly-Brown and her business “received numerous inquiries from people
who appears to have confused Kelly-Brown’s services with Oprah’s [e]vent, [w]ebsite, and
[m]agazine.”151 This competition harmed Kelly-Brown’s brand.152
Oprah contended that under the Sixth Circuit Standard and previous Second Circuit law,
“use as a trademark, is a threshold requirement for adequately alleging a claim of
infringement.”153 While the Sixth Circuit viewed the use of a mark under a likelihood of
confusion lens, the Second Circuit examined the criteria for use of a mark in relation to a fair use
defense and disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s use of a mark in its likelihood of confusion
analysis.154
Oprah claimed that this case was similar to Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co.155 in that
her use of the phrase “Own Your Power” as a headline but not as a trademark.156 In Packman,
the Chicago Tribune sold t-shirts with a reprinted headline from its issue celebrating the Chicago
Bulls sixth NBA championship.157 Plaintiff brought in action claiming that the newspaper had
violated her rights in federal and state trademarks because the headline from that day read “the
joy of six.”158 The Seventh Circuit held that the use of the phrase “the joy of six” was a headline
and that the distinctiveness of the Tribune’s masthead dispelled any possible consumer confusion
because consumers would clearly identify the t-shirts and other memorabilia sold with the
newspaper.159
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The Second Circuit in Kelly-Brown rejected this argument. The court found, that when
determining whether an alleged infringer used a competitor’s mark, the correct inquiry is
“whether the defendant is using the term as a symbol to attract public attention.”160 The court
further noted that in making this determination, “we must conduct a close examination of the
content and context of the use.” 161 The court found that Oprah’s “wide-ranging and varied” use
met this standard because repetition “forges an association in the minds of consumers between a
marketing device and a product.162 The court noted that it was apparent that Oprah was
attempting to associate herself with the phrase “Own Your Power.”163
The court also took issue with the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to change the well-established
likelihood of confusion inquiry.164 The court found the Sixth Circuit’s standard inconsistent with
a clearly delineated standard that required an intensive factual inquiry, especially since the Sixth
Circuit “elevate[d] one particular consideration, which is not even one of the eight Polaroid
factors, above all the other factors.”165 The Second Circuit also observed that it had previously
allowed infringement claims to proceed when there was no use of a mark.166 The court further
expressed concern that the Sixth Circuit’s standard would stop these cases at the door without
looking into the determinative question of “whether consumers were actually confused by the
allegedly infringing product.”167 In sum, the Second Circuit held that the likelihood of consumer
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confusion is paramount in determining whether use of a trademark rises to the level of
infringement.
Part IV. Analysis
Use as a Trademark and Public Policy
The ultimate question then is whether use as a trademark is a threshold requirement for
an infringement action. The answer, as the Second Circuit correctly pointed out, should be
unequivocally no.168 This is not to say the Sixth Circuit reached the wrong result in Hensley
Mfg. but the process and reasoning used to reach its conclusion was faulty. In fact, it appears the
Sixth Circuit unnecessarily established a presumptive fair use standard by requiring a threshold
showing that the alleged infringer is using the designation as a mark without any consideration of
the Polaroid factors or the existence of the keystone of infringement, likelihood of confusion.169
The Sixth Circuit expanded the nominative fair use defense further than was
contemplated. The Ninth Circuit in recognition that sometimes, trademarks designate a product
where “there is no descriptive substitute” promulgated nominative fair use.170 This occurs when
there is “a problem closely related to genericity and descriptiveness . . . when many goods and
services are effectively identifiable only by their trademarks.”171 In New Kids on the Block, the
court found particularly persuasive the fact that it would be unreasonable to refer to the music
group in any other way.172 Furthermore, nominative fair use only occurs when the alleged
infringer is using plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff.173 That is, nominative fair use of a
trademark is not infringing use because the alleged infringer is not trying to take advantage of
168
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plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill by using plaintiff’s mark as a designation of the infringer’s
goods.174 Courts extended nominative fair use to include post-domain paths on the internet.175
The courts noted that the internet is a unique medium and the existence of a trademark in a postdomain path probably does not signify source.176 This is because consumers are unlikely to type
in the full, complicated, web address that includes the trademark in question of a competitor to
try and find plaintiff’s product.177 In Hensley though, the defendant was using the trademark as a
way to identify the source of the goods.178 After all, Jim Hensley moved his business to ProPride
and attempted to capitalize on his personal reputation instead of the reputation of his previous
business.179 This fulfills the policy of allowing an individual to take advantage of his personal
reputation not the policy advocated by nominative fair use.180
This was not the case in Kelly-Brown. There, Oprah and her cohorts were attempting to
forge a relationship between Kelly-Brown’s mark and Oprah.181 The Second Circuit noted that
Oprah did not use the mark once but had used repetition to try to nurture the association she was
attempting to build between the mark and her brand.182 Oprah was not using the mark “Own
Your Power” to refer to Kelly-Brown.183 Oprah was, albeit possibly unintentionally, trying to
convert Kelly-Brown’s mark for her own use and benefit.184 Nevertheless, such use would not
fall under the Sixth Circuits requirement of “use as a trademark” before going on to a likelihood
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of confusion analysis. Thus, Kelly-Brown would be without recourse and rendered helpless to
defend her mark. This clearly frustrates the aims of trademark law.185
Additionally, this argument should not even be raised. The fair use and nominative fair
use defense are defenses. The Sixth Circuit, by requiring use as a trademark as a threshold
requirement, is virtually requiring a plaintiff to disprove an element of a defense before it is even
raised. It is the burden of the defendant to prove that he is using the mark in a non-infringing
way that does not signify himself as the source of the goods. Trademark law serves the dual
purpose of protecting both the consumer from confusing marks in the market place and to protect
an owner’s investment of time, resources, and capital of an owner into building a mark that
signifies the owner’s right to control the quality of his goods.186
The Second Circuit properly recognized the futility of this standard. The ultimate
question that needs to be asked in an infringement action is whether it is likely that consumers
are going to be confused.187 The Sixth Circuit inexplicably put itself in the shoes of the
consumer when it announced that as long as an alleged infringer uses the trademark in some way
that does not signify source, it is impossible for any significant portion of the relevant consumer
population to be confused.188
There are real dangers in adopting the Sixth Circuit’s standard. Assuming that the Sixth
Circuit is correct in holding use of a mark as a trademark is a threshold requirement how would
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Kelly-Brown change? After all, Oprah was not using the
phrase “Own Your Power” at the magazine event in conjunction with any goods or services.189
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On the actual issue of the magazine the phrase was being used just as that, as a phrase.190 It was
not being used to identify any of Oprah’s goods or services or to refer to any of Plaintiff’s goods
or services.191 The interesting fact though was the pervasiveness and extensiveness with which
Oprah and her affiliates attempted to create an association between the phrase “Own Your
Power” and Oprah, an affiliation that led to direct consumer confusion.192 Under the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis, such actual consumer confusion is immaterial because as long as the mark was
not being used as a trademark then there can be no likelihood of confusion under trademark
law.193 This backwards thinking bears dire consequences for trademark owners because it has
the danger of taking control away from owners protecting their reputation and goodwill.194
Likelihood of Confusion
The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether
likelihood of confusion existed but it may be helpful to do a quick breakdown of whether or not a
court could find likelihood of confusion in this instance. Recall that the eight factors for
likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood the senior user will bridge the gap;
(5) actual consumer confusion; (6) the junior user’s intent; (7) the quality of the junior user’s
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.195 A brief look shows that some of these
factors could very well exist in Kelly-Brown.
Similarity Between the Marks, Proximity of the Products, and Bridging the Gap
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“Similarity of the marks is judged by their sound, appearance and meaning.”196 When
goods or services which the alleged infringing mark is attached to compete with the trademark
owners goods or services for sales then infringement is likely to be found.197 The marks are
extremely similar in that they contain the exact same words.198 The services offered by KellyBrown and Oprah are also almost identical. Anyone who has ever seen Oprah’s show or knows
of her reputation would be hard put to claim Oprah is not inspirational or motivational. These
are the exact services that Kelly-Brown provides.199 Since the proximity of the services offered
are so close, it is unnecessary to contemplate whether Kelly-Brown will bridge the gap because
there is no gap.200
Actual Consumer Confusion
Actual consumer confusion, though not required to prove a likelihood of confusion,
“provides strong support for a finding of a likelihood of confusion.”201 Kelly-Brown testified
that she and her offices received numerous phone calls inquiring about the mark used in
conjunction with Oprah.202 Therefore, it is obvious that Oprah’s use of such a similar mark
could have caused actual confusion.
Intent
“Where an infringer adopts a particular name with knowledge of plaintiff’s mark, courts
presume there was an intent to copy the mark.”203 Intent is not required to actually prove
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likelihood of confusion.204 There is also evidence that Oprah’s representatives appropriated the
mark in bad faith.205 The Second Circuit noted that Oprah’s representatives would have almost
definitely come across Kelly-Brown’s pending registration when they were in the process of
acquiring the rights to “OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK.”206 Based on this it is clear that a
court or fact-finder could determine that there was intent to copy Kelly-Brown’s mark.
Types of Confusion Present
Initial Interest Confusion
Initial interest confusion occurs when a prospective customer believes there is some
affiliation between the infringing product and the original trademark owner.207 Although in
Kelly-Brown the marks were similar in sound and appearance this is not required for initial
interest confusion as long as the prospective consumer initially believes there is some connection
between the products.208 There could easily be initial interest confusion because consumers’
who saw the magazine in stores might think, reasonably, that Kelly-Brown has teamed up with
Oprah. This could also be the case for anyone who visited Oprah’s website, Facebook page, or
attended the September event.209
Post-Sale Confusion
Post-sale confusion does not affect the direct consumer but rather the secondary viewer
of the mark.210 Thus, it is another party who views the junior goods and believes them to be the
product of the original trademark owner.211 This takes the quality of the goods outside the hands
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of the original trademark owner.212 There could be post-sale confusion when those with
knowledge of Kelly-Brown would see others reading Oprah’s magazine, say in a doctor’s office,
and assume that Kelly-Brown has now teamed up with Oprah.
Reverse Confusion
Reverse confusion occurs when consumers believe that the senior user’s mark infringes
the junior user’s.213 This can cause the senior user’s reputation to be irreparably harmed.214
Normally in a reverse confusion case, the weaker the senior user’s mark the more likely he will
prevail.215 Here, there is a very real possibility of reverse confusion. Oprah is an international
celebrity with far-reaching influence.216 Her ability to saturate the market with references to
potential marks is almost unparalleled. In this case, there was a strategic and well-implemented
marketing plan to create an association in consumer’s minds between “Own Your Power” and
Oprah.217 The average consumer is probably much more likely to encounter Oprah’s products
and services. A consumer who then subsequently found Kelly-Brown’s services could very
reasonably believe that Kelly-Brown was infringing on Oprah’s mark. This is the very definition
of reverse confusion.
As is readily apparent, the danger of likelihood of consumer confusion should not rest on
a judicially created test to determine if the designation is being used as a trademark but instead
should focus on the whole purpose of the likelihood of confusion test, whether a significant
portion of the relevant public could be confused.218 This focus fulfills both aims of trademark
law and further reinforces the correctness of the Second Circuit’s standard that, for trademark
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infringement, the use of a mark requirement should focus on whether or not the designation is
being used to garner attention instead of whether it is being used as a source-identifier.
Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit inexplicably narrows trademark protection by raising one of the
Polaroid factors, use as a trademark, above all others. The Sixth Circuit fails to account for one
of the main pillars of trademark law, protecting consumers from confusion. The Second Circuit
is correct in keeping the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in assessing trademark
infringement. The Second Circuit strikes the correct balance between upholding the goals of
trademark law and extinguishing frivolous infringement claims.

